Survival under the ADA: The Federal Common Law Standard for Determining Survival Claims by Booth, William
DePaul Journal of Health Care Law 
Volume 2 
Issue 2 Winter 1998 Article 3 
November 2015 
Survival under the ADA: The Federal Common Law Standard for 
Determining Survival Claims 
William Booth 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jhcl 
Recommended Citation 
William Booth, Survival under the ADA: The Federal Common Law Standard for Determining Survival 
Claims, 2 DePaul J. Health Care L. 269 (1998) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jhcl/vol2/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Health Care Law by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more 
information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
SURVIVAL UNDER THE ADA:
THE FEDERAL
COMMON LAW STANDARD
FOR DETERMINING SURVIVAL CLAIMS
William Booth*
INTRODUCTION
Recent federal decisions split concerning the appropriate standard for
determining whether a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) survives a plaintiffs death. One approach applies the general
federal common law standard, which merely evaluates whether the statute
at issue seeks to redress an individual or public wrong.' Under this
standard, claims brought under remedial measures survive plaintiffs
death, whereas claims that are penal in nature do not.2 The second
approach invokes the Civil Rights Act exception to the general common
law rule, which incorporates the closest applicable survival statute from
the forum state.
Although the Civil Rights Act exception does apply to ADA survival
questions, federal courts are not required to wholly incorporate the forum
state's survival law.4 When federal statutes are silent regarding claim
survival, courts possess the discretion to utilize either state law or federal
common law, whichever better serves the federal statute's intent? The
federal common law standard better serves the stated purposes of the
ADA, that of providing a clear and comprehensive mandate for the
*Staff Writer, Journal of Health Care Law. B.A., Eastern Illinois University, 1991.- J D,
(Cand.) DePaul University College of Law, 2000.
'See infra notes 10-21.
2Id.
'See infra notes 64-74.41d.
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elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities, by
providing clear, consistent and enforceable standards addressing such
discrimination. In contrast, the almost infinite variations in state survival
statutes create the possibility that similarly situated plaintiffs, presenting
identical ADA claims in different states, could have entirely different
remedies available to them under the same federal act.
The importance of a consistent ADA survival policy lies in the large
number of terminally ill patients, specifically those with the human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) or acquired immune deficiency syndrome
(AIDS), who seek relief under the act. Following the federal common law
would allow all terminally ill claimants to pursue their ADA actions,
confident that should they not live to see the culmination of their suit;
their claims would, nonetheless, survive. Application of state survival
law, however, would only serve to discourage those terminal plaintiffs
residing in states with unfavorable survival statutes from pursuing
legitimate ADA claims.
BACKGROUND
Federal Rule 25(a) allows a court to order party substitution "[i] f a party
dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished."5 Because this rule is
procedural, however, it does not substantively define whether an action
survives the death of a party, which is a question of substantive law
unaffected by Rule 25(a).6 No general federal survival statute exists, nor
does the ADA contain any provision regarding whether claims raised
under the act survive the death of a party. Generally, absent specific
direction by Congress, survival of a federal action is exclusively a federal
question, and must be decided using federal common law.'
SFed R. Civ. P. § 25(a).
6JAMES WM. MOORE, 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 25.1 0[5][a] (3d cd. 1997).
(d7 A A i I HURR. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURES § 1954Bre F. 5,1iseer9 )(ctg.re.rv hapsI.
U.S 7 ff-I, Bkia8 a rb e r 308 F.2d 558, 561 (9h Cir. 1962) (citing Shreiber v. Sharplms, I 10
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Under Federal Common Law, Remedial
Actions Survive, While Actions That Are
Penal in Nature Must Abate
Under federal common law, survival of an action depends on whether the
recovery sought is remedial or penal in nature." Remedial actions that
compensate an individual for specific harm suffered, survive plaintiffs
death; while penal actions, which impose damages for a general wrong to
the public, must abate.'0 There is a danger, however, of "being misled by
the different shades of meaning" given to the word "penal."" In
Huntington v. Attrill,2 the Supreme Court held that the basis for the
common law tradition of proscribing survival of penal actions lies in the
"general rules of international comity," which held that criminal laws of
a particularjurisdiction are unenforceable outside that jurisdiction. 3 Such
strict interpretation of the word "penal" denotes a corporal or pecuniary
measure, "imposed and enforced by the state for a crime or offense against
its laws. ' 4  However, "penal" commonly describes "extraordinary
liability to which the law subjects a wrongdoer in favor of the person
wronged, not limited to the damages suffered."' 5 Therefore, the "tenor of
the [Huntington] Court's opinion," is that, although statutes providing a
right of recovery for an individual may have a penal element, under a
common law definition, the word "penal" denotes purely criminal laws.b
To determine whether lawmakers intended a cause of action under a
given statute to be remedial or penal in nature, courts are typically
required to make an inference from the language and history of that
statute.1 7 To do this, most courts rely on the test developed by the sixth
circuit in Murphy v. Household Finance Corporation, which held that a
double damages cause of action under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA)
was not penal, and, thus, passed to the trustee in bankruptcy upon
9Schreiber, 110 U.S. at 80.
'
0ld.; Kilgo v. Bownman Transp., 789 F.2d 859,876(1lth Cir. 1986); Untcd Ste3 ' NEC,
11 F.3d 136, 137 (11 th Cir. 1993).
"Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 666 (1892).
12Id.
3Id. at 669.
4Id. (citing United States v. Reisinger, 128 U.S, 398, 402 (1888)); Unitcd Statc v,
Chouteau, 102 U.S. 603, 611 (1881).
'$Huntington, 146 U.S. at 666.
" Smith v. Dep't of Human Serv., 876 F.2d 832,836 10th Cir. 19S91 (quwtikq Htntn-on,
146 U.S. at 666-78).
"Hawes v. Johnson & Johnson, 940 F. Supp. 697,702 (D. NJ. 1996).
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adjudication. 8 The Murphy opinion distilled the Huntington discussion
of penal laws into three factors, which consider:
(1) whether the purpose of the statute was to redress individual
wrongs or more general wrongs to the public;
(2) whether recovery under the statute runs to the harmed individual
or to the public; and
(3) whether the recovery authorized by the statute is wholly
disproportionate to the harm suffered.19
Claims Brought Under the Truth in Lending Act,
Which is Remedial in Nature,
Survive Plaintiffs Death
Applying the above three factor test to TILA, the court in Murphy first
found that the purpose of the Act was to require creditors to disclose
accurate credit information to consumers, in an effort to prevent fraudulent
practices some lenders used to keep consumers uninformed of the terms
extended to them.2' The Murphy court further held that the "twice the
damages" provision of the Act was intended by Congress to encourage
private causes of action2 ' and, thus, did not constitute the "kind of penalty
courts must narrowly construe within the narrow limits reserved for
strictly penal enactments. 22  Ultimately, Murphy held that double
damages under TLA, as well as accumulated recovery under other laws,
does not "convert an otherwise remedial statutory scheme into a penal
one."
23
Murphy's three factor test for legislative intent, as well as the holding
that TILA was remedial in nature, was subsequently adopted by other
circuits. In Smith v. No. 2 Galesburg Crown Finance Corporation,24 the
Seventh Circuit held that even though TLA had the effect of "redressing
18560 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1977).
'
9 d. at 209.
201d.21id. at 210.
22Id.
2'560 F.2d at 210.
24615 F.2d 407 (7th Cir. 1980).
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a perceived social ill," because the "entire focus of the legislation is on the
options open to the individual consumer ... the primary purpose of the
action is to redress individual wrongs."2  Quoting both Murphy and
Smith, the Fifth Circuit in James i Home Construction Company of
Mobile,26 held that although the TILA in some sense addressed both
individual wrongs and wrongs to the public, the overall purpose of the act
was to "enable the individual consumer ... to credit shop," thus avoiding
the "uninformed use of credit."27 Therefore, although TILA does serve the
interests of the public, it qualifies as a remedial measure; because the
primary purpose of a TILA action is to redress an individual wrong.2 3
Soon after Smith, the Fifth Circuit in In re Wood '9 found that although
TILA "ultimately serves the dual purpose of providing a remedy for harm
to the monetary interests of individuals while serving to deter socially
undesirable lending practices;" because the congressional intent was to
encourage the individual consumer to prosecute directly by being allowed
to recover directly, such a statutory scheme cannot be "properly
characterized as penal."3 Thus, due to the overall remedial nature of the
TILA, all claims raised under the Act, including punitive damages, would
survive the death of the plaintiff.
ADEA Compensatory Claims Survive Plaintiff's
Death, However, the Liquidated Damages
Provision is Penal in Nature and Must Abate
Like TILA, compensatory damages under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) survive the death of a plaintiff as well. Relying
on Ricca v. United Press International3' (at the time the only other case
to consider ADEA claim survival32), Asklar v. Honeywell"3 used the
Murphy test to find that the primary purpose of the ADEA, to
"compensate, and where appropriate reinstate, individuals who suffered
2-Sld. at 414.
26621 F.2d 727 (5th Cir. 1980).
271d. at 730.
28Id.
'In re Wood, 643 F.2d 188 (5th Cir. 1980).
'"Id. at 191.
"Ricca v. United Press Int'l, 28 F.E.P. 1816 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
-2See Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 125 (1985) (the Supreme Court held
that the liquidated damages provision of the ADEA was punitive in nature).
"95 F.R.D. 419 (D. Conn. 1982).
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employment discrimination because of their advanced age," qualified as
remedial in nature.34 Asklar further held, notwithstanding the liquidated
damages provision, recovery under the Act remained remedial; because
it was based on demonstrated loss, which was not disproportionate to the
harm suffered.35
While compensatory damages under ADEA continued to survive
plaintiffs death, the Supreme Court determined, in Trans World Airlines
v. Thurston, 6 that the legislative history of the ADEA showed "Congress
intended for liquidated damages to be punitive in nature., 37 The original
bill contained a provision that called for criminal liability for a willful
violation.38  Due to "difficult problems of proof' in a criminal
investigation for employment discrimination, including an employer's
invocation of the Fifth Amendment, a provision was proposed to eliminate
the criminal penalty in favor of the double or liquidated damages
provision.39 Such a provision would "furnish an effective deterrent to
willful violations [of ADEA]." 4° For this reason, while ADEA survival
questions decided after Thurston allowed actions for compensatory
damages to survive plaintiff's death, recovery sought under the liquidated
damages provisions would not.41 Thus, under common law analysis, as
long as the federal statute underlying a plaintiffs action qualifies under
the Murphy test as remedial in nature, and neither the specific language of
the statute, nor its legislative history can be interpreted as evidence of
congressional intent that a particular form of recovery under the act is
penal, the claim in its entirety will survive plaintiff's death.
341d. at 424.
35Id. at 423.
36469 U.S. 111 (1985).
371d. at 125.
311 13 CONG. REc. 2199 (1967).
3'469 U.S. at 125 (citing S. Res. 788, 90th Cong. (1967)).401d.
4 See Smith v. Dep't of Human Serv., 876 F.2d 832, 835-37 (10th Cir. 1989) (because the
action was solely for liquidated damages, which the Supreme Court determined in Thurston to be
penal, the action does not survive plaintiffs death); and Hawes v. Johnson & Johnson, 940 F.
Supp. 697, 703 (1996) holding that compensatory damages survived plaintiffs death, but the
liquidated damages must abate in light of Thurston).
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Both the Overall Purpose, and the Remedies
Available Under the ADA Satisfy the
Murphy Test for Remedial Legislation
The opening section of the ADA easily satisfies the initial Murphy
criterion by providing an overall legislative purpose addressing individual
wrongs, rather than focusing on conduct that constitutes a more general.
or public wrong.42 Under the findings and purpose section of the ADA,
Congress declared an intent to provide legal recourse for individuals who
suffer discrimination based on physical or mental disabilities. While this
section establishes the goal of providing a "national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities,' it
seeks to provide "enforceable standards addressing discrimination against
individuals with disabilities,'"4  and to "ensure that the Federal
Government plays a central role in enforcing [these] standards ... on behalf
of individuals vith disabilities. ' b While the ADA may have the
secondary effect of "redressing [the] perceived social ill,', 7 of
discrimination against the disabled, the plain language of this section
demonstrates that the entire focus of this legislation is to provide more
effective legal means for individual disabled persons to combat the
discrimination they themselves have suffered. Analysis under the second
and third Murphy criteria proves more difficult, however, as different
remedies apply depending on whether the action seeks recovery for
employment discrimination, or discrimination by a public entity.3
Chapter I of the ADA prohibits discrimination "against a qualified
individual vith a disability ... in regard to job application procedures, the
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation,
job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.'
For violations of Chapter I, Section 12117 of the ADA incorporates the
remedies and procedures set forth in Section 2000e-5 of the Civil Rights
Act, which provides that if a court finds [defendant] "intentionally
engaged ... in an unlawful employment practice ... the court may enjoin
42Murphy v. Household Fin. Corp., 560 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1997).
43Public Health & Welfare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4), (b) (West 1998) (cmphasi Z )
4442 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (West 1998) (emphasis added),
4'42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (West 1998) (emphasis added).
4'42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(3) (West 1998) (emphasis added).41Smith v. No. 2 Galesburg Crown Fin. Corp., 615 F.2d 407,414 (7th Cir. 1950}
4"See 42 U.S.C. § 12117, 12133 (West 1998).
4942 U.S.C. § 12112 (West 1998).
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the [defendant] from ... such ... practice, and order such affirmative action
... as ... reinstatement or hiring of employees," reimbursement for back
pay, and any other appropriate forms of equitable relief" In addition to
the section 2000e-5(g) remedies, section 1981 a(a)(2) of the Civil Rights
Act also allows compensatory and punitive damages for violations of
section 12112(b)(5) of the ADA.' Section 12112(b)(5) addresses
discrimination caused by the failure to make "reasonable accommodations
to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
individual," or "denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or
employee who is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability" when
denial is based on the need to make reasonable accommodations for such
disabilities. 2 As with punitive damages sought under TILA,"3 the mere
fact punitive damages may be available, does not "convert an otherwise
remedial statutory scheme into a penal one. 54
Chapter II of the ADA prohibits discrimination that denies an
individual the "benefits of the services, programs or activities of a public
entity." 5 "Public entity" is defined as:
A) any State or local government;
B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or other
instrumentality of a State or local government; and
C) the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any
commuter authority. 6
For violations of Chapter II of the Act, section 12133 incorporates the
remedies provided in Section 794a of the Rehabilitation Act. 7 Section
794a of the Rehabilitation Act, in turn, refers to Sections 2000e-16 and
2000e-5(f) through (k) for available remedies. 8 Thus, as with actions
'042 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (West 1998). In addition, subsection (k) allows recovery of
reasonable attorneys' fees for the prevailing party, subject to the discretion of the court. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(k).
5'42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2) (West 1998).
'242 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (West 1998).
3See discussion supra Part I.A. 1.
54Murphy v. Household Fin. Corp., 560 F.2d 206, 210 (6th Cir. 1977).
"s42 U.S.C. § 12132 (West 1995).
5642 U.S.C. § 12131(1). See also 49 U.S.C. §24102 (3) (West 1998) (defining commuter
authority).
'42 U.S.C. § 12133 (West 1998).
829 U.S.C. § 794a (West 1998).
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brought under Chapter I, injunctive and other equitable remedies provided
by Section 2000e-5(g)(1) are available for claims brought under Chapter
II of the Act as well. The remedies available under 2000e-5(g)(1),
common to actions under both chapters of the ADA, run to the vonged
individual, rather than the general public.59 While reinstating a x'ongfully
discharged employee, reimbursing an employee for lost back pay, or
enjoining the employer from continuing discriminatory practices, may
tangentially advance a general societal goal to end discrimination against
the disabled, such remedies, first and foremost run to compensate the
wronged individual.
The compensatory and punitive damages allowed for violations of
Section 12112 also fall within the criteria of the Mfurphy test. The very
language of the applicable subsection, which provides recovery for "future
pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental
anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary loses," denotes
recovery that runs to the individual harmed, not to the general public."
In addition, Section 198la(b)(3) places limits on the sum of compensatory
and punitive damages awarded based on the number of employees
retained by the defendant during the current or preceding calendar year."t
These congressionally imposed limits on recovery, plus the fact that all
remedies available under the ADA are based on demonstrated loss,
establishes that recovery under the Act is not disproportionate to the harm
suffered. The legislation addresses individual wrongs by providing legal
recourse for individuals who suffer discrimination due to their disability.
Remedies for such discrimination runs to the wronged individual and are
proportional to the demonstrated loss, thus meeting the Aurphy criteria for
a remedial enactment.
59See discussion of the Murphy test supra Part I.A.I.
6 42 U.S.C. § 19S1a(b)(3) (West 1998).
6142 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (Vest 1998). Sections (A)-(D) limit compnisatory daamie3 to:
$50,000 for defendant with fourteen to 100 employees for twenty or more weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year;, S100,000 for employers with 101 to 200 employees for tw,.enty or more
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year; S200,000 for employers vath 201 to 590
employees for twenty or more weeks in the current or preceding calendar year;, and to S300,000
for employers with more than 500 employees for twenty or more weeks in the current or prcezcing
calendar year. 42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(3)(A)-(D).
62See Asklar v. Honeywell, 95 F.R.D. 419,423 (D.Conn. 1982).
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Section 1988 Allows Courts the Discretion
to Apply Either Forum State Law or
Federal Common Law
Presenting a "unique departure from the general [federal common law]
rule," section 1988 of the Civil Rights Act appears to defer to state law all
matters not directly addressed by federal civil rights statutes.63 Section
1988 provides "in the context of civil rights actions," for federal laws that
fail to provide "suitable remedies," courts are instructed to turn to the
"common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and the
statutes of the [forum] state. '64 Following the Supreme Court's holding
in Robertson v. Wegman,65 the majority of federal courts interpret section
1988 as requiring application of state survival law "so long as the result
is consistent with the United States Constitution and its laws."6 In
Wegman, the majority's reasoning focused mainly on whether
incorporation of state survival statutes is "inconsistent with the
Constitution and the laws of the United States.67 The Supreme Court held
that a Louisiana survivorship law only allowing an action to "survive in
favor of a spouse, children, parents, or siblings" 68 was not inconsistent
with federal statutes and constitutional provisions, nor the "policies
expressed in them., 69  Absent in the Court's reasoning was any
comparison of the Louisiana statute with the federal common law rule for
survivorship. Instead, in a self-described "narrow" decision70 the majority
636 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 25.10[5][b] (3d ed. 1997).
"Robertson v. Wegman, 436 U.S. 584, 588 (1978) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §1988).
6436 U.S. 584 (1978).
'Id. at 589-90 (Applying Louisiana tort survival law). See also Small v. American Tele.
& Tele. Co., 759 F. Supp. 1427, 1428 (W.D. Mo. 1991) (applying Missouri tort survival law,
which allows survival of compensatory and punitive damages); Slade v. United States Postal Serv.,
952 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1991) (applying the Oklahoma survival statute for personal injury
actions); Glanz v. Vemick, 750 F. Supp. 39, 42-43 (D. Mass 1990) (applying Massachusetts tort
survival law, which only allows survival of compensatory damages); Oliver v. United States
Army, 758 F. Supp. 484,485 (E.D. Ark. 1990) (applying Arkansas tort survival law, which allows
survival of bodily or personal injury, not injury to feelings, reputation, or for malicious
prosecution).
Note, however, that in Khan v. Grotnes Metalforming Sys., 679 F. Supp. 751, 756 (N.D.
Ill. 1988) the Northern District of Illinois applied federal common law analysis in holding that a
Title VII claim survives plaintiff's death, because it is remedial in nature.
67Wegnman, 436 U.S. at 589-90; 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (West 1997).
"
3Id. at 591.
691d. at 590 (quoting Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 240 (1969).701d. at 594.
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simply held that under Section 1988, the federal district court "was
required to adopt" the Louisiana survival statute' and could only look to
the federal common law "as a secondary matter.""- Appearing to rely
more on the weakness of respondent's argument than on the strength of
prior decisions, the Court summarized its decision as reversing the
judgment of the court of appeal; because "[r]espondent's only complaint
about [the Louisiana survival law] is that it would cause [his] action to
abate." 7
3
Justice Blackmun's Dissent in Robertson v. Wegman
Highlights the Flaws in the Majority Opinion,
While Presenting a Strong Case for a More
Liberal Interpretation of Section 1988
Justice Blackmun's dissent74 in Wegman highlights the majority's failure
to effectively overcome two prior decisions that support a more liberal
interpretation of section 1988. The majority failed to acknowledge the
language in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park75 which held that section 1983
is to be read as providing the utilization of both state and federal rules,
whichever better serves the policies expressed in the federal statutes.,J
Under this interpretation, automatic deference to state survival law ignores
a determination of whether application of state statute, or federal common
law, better serves the underlying policies of the statute.' As Blackmnun
discussed, the majority's narrow interpretation of section 1988 strips the
statute of its primary intention, that of giving courts "flexibility to shape
their procedures and remedies in accord with the underlying policies of the
Civil Rights Acts, allowing them to choose "whichever 'better serves'
those policies."78
Justice Blackmun further pointed to Carey v. Piphus,7' a civil rights
action decided in the same term as Wegman, where the Court fashioned a
federal damages rule from common law sources without consideration of
71Id. at 593, n.11.
'Robertson v. Wegman, 436 U.S. 584, 595 (1978) (Blackmun dissentfing
7"Id. at 594.
'
4Justices Brennan and White joined Justice Blackmun's disent
'Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
76436 U.S. 584, 596 (1969) (quoting Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 240).
77d at 596.
'AId. (quoting Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 240).
"Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
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any corresponding forum-state statute.80 Unlike in Wegman, the Court in
Carey v. Piphus did not first look to the forum state law to test it for
possible inconsistencies with the "federal scheme, before embracing a
federal common-law rule."'" Instead the Court fashioned a rule "in light
of the historic common-law concerns and the policies of the Civil Rights
Acts. 82  Although the majority of courts follow Wegman's strict
interpretation of section 1988, in light of the points raised by Justice
Blackmun's dissent, reliance on the federal common law appears to be
more in line both with traditional doctrine and the very specific purposes
of the Civil Rights Act. According to Blackmun, the primary concerns of
section 1988 are the "compensation of the victims of unconstitutional
action, and deterrence of like conduct in the future. ' '83 Justice Blackmun
stated that a "federal rule of survivorship allows uniformity, ' ' 4 which
would insure that "[litigants identically aggrieved in their federal civil
rights, residing in ... adjacent [s]tates, will not have different results due
to the vagarities of state law." 8
5
Absent Express Language to the Contrary, Statutes
are to be Interpreted as Upholding Long-Established
Common Law Principles
Automatic application of state survival law over federal common law
ignores another long-standing principle that "statute[s] which invade the
common law ... are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention
of long-established and familiar principles, except when a statutory
purpose to the contrary is evident."8 6 For a federal statute such as section
1988 to be interpreted as allowing incorporation of a state statute contrary
to the federal common law, the federal legislation must "'speak directly'
to the question addressed by the common law." 87 Courts are to assume
"
0Robertson v. Wegman, 436 U.S. 584,597 (1978) (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. at 257-
59). 8 1id.
82Id.
83Id. at 598.
8 Id. at 602.
8SWegman, 436 U.S. at 602.
6United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson,
343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)); Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc. v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108
(1991)).87 Texas, 507 U.S. at 533 (quoting, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625
(1992); Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 315 (1981)).
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that "Congress has legislated with an expectation that [the common law]
principle viii apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is
evident.""'' S A plain statement by Congress, of an intent to abrogate the
common law, is required for the protection of "weighty and constant
values.' ' s9 When faced with a question of statutory interpretation, the issue
is not whether a particular interpretation is wise, but whether such a
reading is consistent with what was intended by the legislature.' " Because
"Congress is understood to legislate against a background of common-law
... principles," 91ajudicial finding contrary to an established common law
principle "[iln traditionally sensitive areas' '92 requires a "clearly expressed
congressional intention." 93  No such language, expressing any
congressional intent to abrogate the federal common law rule for
survivability, exists within either the text or legislative history of section
1988.
Although the vast majority of federal courts follow the Supreme
Court's holding in Wegnan, which calls for the automatic application of
state survivability statutes to federal civil rights claims, such practice
seems contrary both to the correct interpretation of section 1902, and to
the well-established common law doctrine. As the Court held in Sullivan
v. Little Hunting Park,94 incorporation of state survival statues is not
automatic; instead, courts must look to either the federal common law or
state statutes, applying whichever better suits the purpose of the federal
act in question. In addition, long-held common law principles, such as the
federal survivability rule, must be followed unless a statutory purpose to
the contrary is evident.
ANALYSIS OF RELEVANT CASE LAW
Since the enactment of the ADA in July of 1990, federal decisions
concerning survival of ADA claims have split over the proper rule of law.
Two district courts have applied the federal common law, while two other
38Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 10S (1991) (quUmiq lsbrandlzn,
343 U.S. at 783).
'Id. at 109.
'31d at 108.
9 11d
92Idat 109 (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336,349 (1971)),
93Astoria, 501 U.S. at 109 (quoting Morton v. Mancan, 471 US. 535, 551 11974))
9 See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
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district courts have incorporated survival statutes from the forum state.9 "
Unfortunately, neither the Supreme Court nor the federal circuit courts
have directly ruled on the issue of claim survivability under the ADA.'
However, even those districts that follow the common law do not allow
punitive damages to survive, even though the ADA was deemed to have
an overall remedial purpose.
Recent Decisions Applying the Federal Common
Law to Actions Brought Under the
ADA Allowing Compensatory Damages
But Stingy Punitive Damages
In Caraballo v. South Stevedoring,97 plaintiff suffered from interstitial
lung disease and pulmonary fibrosis.9" Seeking compensatory and
punitive damages under the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA), the ADEA
and the ADA, plaintiff alleged that his former employer refused to honor
his reasonable requests for accommodation to his condition, and continued
to require him to work in the presence of hazardous materials and airborne
particles.99 After defendants filed a motion to dismiss on all but three
claims, plaintiff died.00 Defendants then sought to strike all claims for
punitive damages on the grounds that they did not survive plaintiffs
death.' O' The Caraballo opinion cited on the common law standard,
holding that survival of a federal cause of action is a question of federal
law, which "turns on whether the relief sought is 'remedial' or 'penal' in
nature.102 The opinion stated that because punitive damages are "generally
95See discussion infra Parts A and B.
96The seventh circuit has twice considered ADA claims where the plaintiff died before trial
concluded. Although the court did not directly rule on survivability in Hutchinson v. Spink, the
court's opinion did state in dicta that state law govems the survival of ADA claims. 126 F.3d 895,
898 (7th Cir. 1997). An earlier seventh circuit decision, U.S. E.E.O.C. v. AIC Security
Investigations, upheld compensatory and punitive damages for a plaintiff who died of cancer
during trial. 55 F.3d 1276, 1285 (7th Cir. 1995). Strangely, the court's opinion did not discuss
survivability at all. Id. In the remaining ADA survival case, Plumley v. Landmark Chevrolet, the
fifth circuit dismissed plaintiff's claim for lack of actual case or controversy under the ADA, and
therefore did not rule on claim survivability. 122 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 1997).
97Caraballo v. South Stevedoring, 932 F. Supp. 1462 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
9 Id. at 1464.
991d.
100Id.
01d.
.
2Caraballo,932 F.Supp. at 1466 (citing United States v. NEC Corp., II F.3d 136, 137
( lIth Cir. 1993)).
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imposed upon a defendant for a wrong against the public," they are penal
in nature.' a Noting the Supreme Court has held liquidated damages under
the ADEA to be penal in nature, the district court appropriately struck the
liquidated damages plaintiff sought under the Act.'" However, the court
used this same reasoning to incorrectly strike punitive damages sought
under the ADA as well.105
The court relied on Earvin v. Warner-Jenldnson Co.,' where a
Missouri federal magistrate dismissed all punitive damages sought by the
deceased plaintiff's counsel under Title VII of the Civil Right Act. 7,
Grossly misconstruing Muirplin v. Household Finance,"' the magistrate
rationalized dismissal of the punitive damages by stating "the survival of
the punitive damages cause of action would not remedy any wrong to the
public and the punitive damages recovery would have run to the
individual, not to the public,"'0 9 which is precisely two of the three
Murphy criteria that serve as evidence that an enactment is remedial in
nature."0 Under correct AtIphi analysis, penal laws redress public
wrongs and provide recovery under which remedies run to the public,
whereas remedial enactments redress private wrongs and recovery runs to
the wronged individual."' The Caraballo opinion nevertheless uses this
incorrect application of the trphIy standard as its sole support for
abatement of punitive claims raised under a primarily remedial
provision."'
The second federal decision to apply the common law, rule, Estwickl
v. U.S. Air Shuttle, "3 involved a plaintiff who suffered from prostate
"
31d. (citing Kilgo v. Bowaman Transp., 7S9 F.2d 832, 876 (11 th Cir 19861)
I41d. (citing Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 1993)),
"'Ild. (citing Smith v. Department of Human Serv., 576 F.2d 832, -37 101h Cir 19%'I,
Duart v. FMC Wyoming Corp., 859 F. Supp. 1447, 1451 n.2 ID. Wyo 1994), anrd Ear n V
Wamer-Jenkinson Co., No. 4:94 CV 977 DDN, 1995 WL 137437, at *1 tED Mo Mar 10,
1995).
'"SNo. 4:94 CV 977 DDN, 1995 WL 137437, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 10, 19951
107Id.
JOSMurphy v. Household Fin. Corp., 560 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 19771 Sce dtz-cu ion of
Murphy supra part A.1.A.
'° Earvin v. Wamer-Jenkins Co., No. 4:94cv977DDN, 1995 WL 137437 at *2 1cmtr',
Murphy, 560 F.2d at 209).
"OSee Murphy, 560 F.2d at 209.
.'See discussion supra part A.I.A.
"
2Caraballo v. South Stevedoring, 932 F. Supp 1462, 1460 iSD. Fla. 199tt
"
3Estwick v. U.S. Air Shuttle, 950 F. Supp. 493 IE.D.N.Y. 1996),
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cancer when he was laid off two months prior to his sixty-third birthday."14
Plaintiffs wife, as administratrix of his estate, brought an action for
discrimination against her late husband's former employer pursuant to the
Civil Rights Act, the ADEA, the ADA and a New York Human Rights
provision. n 5  Defendants moved for summary judgment on several
grounds, including a claim that plaintiffs action did not survive her
husband's death." 6 The district court held that absent specific direction
by Congress; whether "an action created by federal statute survives the
death of the plaintiff is a matter of federal common law."' 7 Here, as in
Caraballo, the court ruled that because the ADA is silent as to whether a
cause of action survives plaintiffs death, the threshold question thus
becomes whether the statute is penal or remedial in nature" 8 Finding the
ADA to be remedial in nature, the court upheld the compensatory damage
claim, but dismissed the punitive damages as "plainly penal.""' 9 Once
again, like Caraballo, the district court allowed itself to be mislead by the
"different shades of meaning" the common law has for the word
"penal,"' O2 thus incorrectly dismissing punitive damages that should have
survived due to the remedial nature of the act under which they were
brought.
Recent Decisions Applying State Survival Statutes
to ADA Claims Illustrate the Unpredictable
Results Inherent to Such an Approach
In contrast to Caraballo and Estwick, Rosenblum v. Colorado Dep 't of
Health'2 ' employed a strict interpretation of section 1988 and applied
Colorado survival law to plaintiff's action against her former employer.'
Plaintiff s ADA alleged she suffered discrimination based on her diabetic
condition, but she died soon after the action commenced. 23  When
"Id. at 496.
I2d. See N.Y. EXEC. L. § 296 3-a(a) (West 1993) (state civil rights law prohibiting
discrimination against persons over the age of eighteen because of such individual's age).
"'Estwick, 950 F. Supp. at 496.
'"Id. at 498 (citing Asklar v. Honeywell, 95 F.R.D. 419 (D. Conn. 1982)).
181d.
119 d.
"'Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 666 (1982).
"'Rosenblum v. Colorado Dep't of Health, 878 F. Supp. 1404 (D. Colo. 1994).
'id. at 1408-09.
1id. at 1405.
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plaintiff's daughter was substituted as the representative of her estate,
defendant filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that because
plaintiff died, her daughter could not recover either pain and suffering, or
prospective earnings or benefits for periods of time after the date of her
death.12
4
The court held because the ADA did not address the issue of survival
of causes of action, courts must "look to state law, provided that it is not
'inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. ,,1
25
Colorado law provides that "damages recoverable after the death of
[plaintiff] shall be limited to loss of earnings and expenses sustained or
incurred prior to death, and shall not include damages for pain, suffering,
or disfigurement, nor prospective profits or earnings after date of
death.' ' 126 Finding the Colorado provision consistent with the ADA and
its underlying policies of deterrence and victim compensation, the court
held that plaintiff may not recover damages for pain and suffering. '2
Applying Colorado law produced a result inconsistent with the federal
common law, which would allow damages for pain and suffering, as a
recovery which is remedial in nature. More importantly, the Colorado
provision that dismissed plaintiffs damages for pain and suffering
expressly contradicts section 1981 (b)(3) which provides recovery for pain
and suffering caused by action violative of Title I of the ADA.1'2
Also following the strict interpretation of section 198, Allred i.
Solaray,124 involved a plaintiff with HIV who filed claims against his
former employer under both the ADA and Utah's Anti-Discriminatory Act
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.'25 Although the district
court cited Estwick and Caraballo as authority for denying punitive
damages, the court nonetheless applied the Utah tort survival statute to
determine whether the compensatory claims survived.' Utah's survival
statute provides that "causes of action arising out of personal injury to the
241d. at 140S.5Id. (quoting Robertson v. Wegman, 436 U.S. 584, 588-89 (1978)).
'
26COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-101(1).
""
7Rosenblum v. Colorado Dep't of Health, 878 F. Supp. 1404, 140S (D. Colo 1994j.
'-See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (West 1998) (Prohibiting disErimination baxd on thQ failure
to provide reasonable employment accommodations for othervise qualified disablcd indi iduals)
4Allred v. Solaray, 971 F. Supp. 1394 (D. Utah 1997).
'2"Id. at 1395.
12 6 d
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person ... do not abate upon the death of the ... injured person. 12 Based on
language used in the Utah survival statute, the district court narrowly
defined "personal injury" to mean a physical injury, not encompassing an
invasion of personal rights.1 2' Because discrimination claims under the
ADA are claims for injuries to rights or reputation, and not an actual
bodily injuries, the district court held that plaintiffs ADA claims could
not survive his death under Utah survival law.
1 29
Although the district court held the ADA to be a remedial act, and the
damages sought here by plaintiff were remedial in nature, the
particularities of Utah survival statutes did not allow the claim to survive.
Although short on the particular facts as alleged by the plaintiff, the Allred
opinion does state that plaintiffs claim was based on his former
employer's intentional infliction of emotional distress, and that plaintiff
sought damages for emotional pain and suffering. 30 As with Rosenblum,
the Utah statute contradicts section 198 la(b)(3), which specifically allows
compensatory and punitive damages for mental anguish, emotional pain
and suffering caused by an employer's violation of Title I of the ADA.'
The unfortunate result reached in Rosenblum highlights one of the
most important argument for universal application of the common law to
survival questions under the ADA, namely the protection of the rights of
terminally ill patients, specifically those with HIV or AIDS. Many federal
decisions have held that individuals with HIV or AIDS are "disabled"
within the meaning of the ADA.' 32  Unfortunately, due to the high
'
2 Id. at 1396, quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-12(l)(a)(1996)).
'
28id. at 1397.
'
29Allred v. Solaray, 971 F. Supp. 1394, 1397 (D. Utah 1997).
"Old. at 1395.
...See supra notes 130-131.
"'Hoepfl v. Barlow, 906 F. Supp. 317, 319 n.7 (E.D. Va. 1995). See also 28 C.F.R.
36.104(1)(iii) ("The phrase physical or mental impairment includes ... HIV disease (whether
symptomatic or asymptomatic")); D.B. v. Bloom, 896 F. Supp 166, 170 (D.NJ. 1995) ("[Plaintiff]
is, by virtue of his HIV status, a person with a disability"); Howe v. Hull, 873 F. Supp. 72, 78
(N.D. Ohio 1994) ("Aids and HIV are both disabilities within the meaning of the ADA"); Abbott
v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 939 (1st Cir. 1997) ("HIV-positive status, simpliciter, whether
symptomatic or asymptomatic, comprises a physical impairment under the ADA"); Gates v.
Rowland, 39 F.3d 1440, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[A] person infected with the HIV virus is an
individual with a disability within the meaning of the [ADA]"); Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495,
1523 (11 th Cir. 1991) (Finding HIV-infected class members handicapped within the meaning of
the Rehabilitation Act); Hemandez v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 96-1316-CIV-T-17C, 1997
LEXIS 15560 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 1997) ("An individual infected with the HIV virus can easily
satisfy the 'substantial impairment of major life activities' prong [of the ADA]"); Doe v. Kohn
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mortality rate for such plaintiffs, combined with delays in the federal
docket, many may not live to see their ADA claims fully adjudicated.
Application of forum-state law could serve to discourage potential
plaintiffs affected by HIV and AIDS from filing ADA claims in states
whose applicable survival laws would not allow their claims to survive "' 3
Likewise, application of forum state law could produce the effect of
promoting discrimination against individuals with terminal disabilities in
those states where any claim under the ADA would not survive plaintiff's
death. Such an outcome does meet the desired goal of an efficient,
consistent national standard to combat discrimination against the disabled.
Yet another complication to raising an ADA claim is the possibility
that applying for or collecting either Social Security Insurance (SSI) or
private disability benefits may preclude eligibility for protection under the
ADA. Although the majority of the federal circuits routinely hold that
receipt of SSI or private benefits does not preclude ADA relief t1 4 some
have ruled otherwise. 3 1 Usually such decisions rest on the theory of
judicial estoppel, the equitable doctrine that precludes parties from tadng
inconsistent positions in judicial proceedings in an effort to protect the
Nost & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1320 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (HIV qualifies under the ADA as a
physical impairment that places substantial limits on the major life actiity of proereatron)
3
'For example, recovery for injury to feelings, reputation or malicious prozcoatfon V Auld
not sunive plaintiffs death in Arkansas. See Oliver v. United States Army, 75S F Supp 4S4, 4Z5
(E.D. Ark. 1990).
"
4See generally Swanks v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth, 166 F 3d 582, 516 i D C
Cir. 1997) ("Both the Social Security Administration and the EEOC agree that the rccLpI of Sui:zia
Security disability benefits does not automatically bar ADA claims-"), Whitbcek '. Vital Srwn_,
116 F.3d 588, 591 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Award ofprivate disability blnefits "doz not prcluJe a later
[ADA] claim that the insured can work with accommodation."), Griffith v. Wal-Mart Storcza, 135
F.3d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 1998) (Denying judicial estoppel on the grounds that 'applc.maton from
and receipt of Social Security benefits ... gives no consideration to that plarson's ability to '.or%
with reasonable accommodation, which is required to be under the ADA, "; Veiler ' Hou_2hul d
Fin. Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 523-24 (7th Cir. 1996) ("ADA's determination of diTabilitt and a
determination under the Social Security disability diverge significantly in their receti' a le2al
standards and statutory intent."); Weigel v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d 461, 466 17th Cir 1j97)
(SSA's decision to grant benefits to plaintiff not "determinative as to '.'hether or not £he mu3 be
considered a 'qualified individual' under the ADA."); Talavera v. School Bd Of Palm B.eah
County, 129 F.3d 1214, 1220 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (SSA benefits application is not 'inhrCnt1y
inconsistent with being a 'qualified individual with a disability' under the ADA "J. and Talur v.
Food World, 133 F.3d 1419, 1423 (1Ith Cir, 1998) (Folloxring Talaveral.
.
3 See McNemar v. The Disney Store, 91 F.3d 610 (3rd Cir 1996) Cle% eland %. Pohcy
Management Sys. Corp., 120 F.3d 513 (5th Cir. 1997); McConath v, Dr. Pepter, Se'en Up
Corp., 131 F.3d 558 (5th Cir. 1998); and Kennedy v. Applause, 90 F3d 1477 !9th Cir 1996)
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"integrity of the judicial process.' 3 6 Judicial estoppel applies when a
litigant successfully asserts that his opponent:
(1) asserted an inconsistent position under oath in a prior judicial
proceeding;
(2) the prior statement was accepted by a judicial tribunal;
(3) he was a litigant to the first judicial proceeding; and
(4) he would be prejudiced unless the opponent is estopped."''
Under this theory, previously certified assertions to the Social Security
Administration (SSA) that a claimant is totally disabled are held to be
wholly inconsistent with later assertions under the ADA that claimant is
a "qualified person with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation can perform the essential functions of the job.' ' 8 Thus,
a claimant who received disability insurance from an employer under a
claim of total disability would be precluded from filing a subsequent ADA
action alleging that this same employer discriminated against the claimant
based on the same disability.
Although judicial estoppel has caused controversy in the very circuits
where it was used to preclude ADA claims,'39 disability benefits remain
a barrier to ADA actions in the Third, Fifth and Ninth Circuits, while the
issue remains undecided in the Second and Eighth Circuits. 4 ' This
presents the possibility that an extremely unlucky claimant, suffering the
compounded misfortune of living in a jurisdiction that follows both the
judicial estoppel doctrine of preclusion and the application of unfavorable
forum state survival law, could lose both SSI/private benefits and ADA
relief available to a similarly-situated claimant in another jurisdiction.
Such an unfair result could occur if a terminally ill plaintiff does not apply
"'McNemar v. The Disney Store, 91 F.3d 610, 617 (3rd Cir. 1996).
'
7McNenzar, 91 F.3d at 617.
"
8Id at 618 (quoting42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a)).
139See Krouse v. American Sterlizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 502-03 (3rd Cir. 1997) ("McNemar
has been the object of considerable criticism," some of which "might be well-founded").14 0See Simon v. Safelite Glass Corp., 128 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 1997); Dusch v. Appleton
Electric Co., 124 F.3d 957, 962 at n.8 (Sth Cir. 1997).
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for disability benefits out of fear that any assertions of total disability to
the SSA would preclude his ADA recovery. Assuming, arguendo, that
this same plaintiff resides in a forum-state jurisdiction with a survival
statute that does not allow his claim to survive his death, plaintiff would
lose both legitimate SSI benefits and his entitled ADA relief, simply due
to geography.
Rather than wait for judicial resolution of this issue, the preferable
and most logical solution would be codification of the federal common
law survival standard. Similar to the default federal statute of
limitations,'4 1 providing a general limitation for actions under federal laws
that do not have a specific limitations period, a general survival statute
could apply to any federal enactment, such as the ADA, which does not
contain a specific survival provision. Such a statute could provide that for
any civil action arising under an Act of Congress that does not contain a
specific survival provision, if plaintiff dies prior to resolution of the
matter, only damages which are compensatory in nature will survive
plaintiff's death. A default survival statute would resolve the current split
concerning ADA claim survival, while merely serving to codify what is
currently held as a long established common law principle.
CONCLUSION
When federal laws subject to section 1988 of the Civil Rights Act fall
silent as to claim survival, courts are directed to look to the federal
common law, as modified by state laws and constitutions. Within this
discretion, courts are required to fashion a rule that is consistent with the
Constitution and federal law. While no general federal statute governing
claim survival exists, the federal common law for survival is well-
established. Under the common law, so long as a statute is deemed
remedial in nature, all recovery sought under such a act survives the death
of a plaintiff, passing to the party substituted in his behalf. Because the
ADA squarely meets the requisite criteria for remedial legislation,
application of the common law standard to ADA survival questions would
141See 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (West 1998) ("Except as othervise provided by law, a civil action
arising under an Act of Congress enacted after the date of the enactment of this secalon may not
be commenced later than [four] years after the cause of action accrues"),
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require that all claims, even those for punitive damages, may survive
plaintiff's death.
Contrary to the majority of federal courts, section 1988 does not
require automatic application of state survival law. Section 1988 allows
courts the discretion to apply state law or the common law, whichever
better serves the purpose of the legislation at issue. For survival questions
arising from actions brought under the ADA, the federal common law rule
for survival best meets the stated purposes of the act. The common law
rule provides a clear and consistent standard to determine when a deceased
plaintiff's ADA suit may continue. Such clarity and consistency is of vital
importance due to the large number of terminally ill plaintiffs, most
notably those with AIDS or HIV, who seek to recovery under the ADA for
discrimination suffered as a result of their diseased status. To subject such
plaintiffs to the varied and inconsistent laws of the fifty states, when a
simple, and long-established federal remedy is available, is not
appropriate.
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